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Hyman: Supreme Court of New York, Kings County: People v. Garcia

SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
KINGS COUNTY
People v. Garcia'
(decided August 26, 2010)
Jose Garcia, at the direction of his attorney, pled guilty to "a
single count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the
seventh degree," as a result of allegedly selling cocaine to two people
in Kings County, New York.2 Consequently, Garcia faced deportation consequences, which he was not made aware of until two years
later when he was arrested at JFK International Airport. Garcia then
filed a CPL 440.10 motion seeking to vacate his judgment of conviction, alleging that, as a result of the recent Supreme Court decision in
Padilla v. Kentucky,4 he received ineffective assistance of counsel
because his defense counsel failed to inform him of the immigration
consequences of a plea agreement.' Moreover, in his affidavit, the
defendant insisted that had Mr. Stoll correctly informed him about
the immigration consequences of his plea, he would have never taken
the plea, implying that his rights were violated under the U.S. Constitution6 and the New York Constitution.7 The Garcia court then
granted the defendant's CPL 440.10 motion, holding that Padillawas
to be applied retroactively, and that the defendant received ineffective

907 N.Y.S.2d 398 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 2010).
Id. at 399.
SId. at 400-01.
4 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (U.S. 2010) (holding that defense counsel must inform their
clients of immigration consequences as a result of accepting a guilty plea).
Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 399.
6 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in pertinent part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence."
7 Article I, section 6 of the New York Constitution states, in pertinent part: "In any trial in
any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and
with counsel as in civil actions and shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and be confronted with the witnesses against him or her." See also Garcia, 907
N.Y.S.2d at 401.
2
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assistance of counsel as he satisfied both prongs of the Strickland
test.
On May 24, 2006, Detective Ryan allegedly observed the defendant, Jose Garcia, selling cocaine. 9 The defendant was subsequently "indicted on two counts each of criminal sale of a controlled
substance in the third degree,'0 criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fifth degree," and criminal possession of a controlled
substance in the seventh degree."' 2 On February 27, 2008, while being represented by attorney Andrew Stoll, the defendant, Garcia, accepted a plea offer in which he would plead guilty to "a single count
of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree."' 3 Immediately after accepting the plea he was sentenced. 14
However, during the plea proceeding, the court informed Mr. Stoll
that the defendant should assume he is deportable."
The defendant alleged that before entering the plea of guilty,
he asked Mr. Stoll about the possible immigration consequences of a
guilty plea, and Mr. Stoll, who was unfamiliar with immigration law,
"declined to research the issue . . . and informed the defendant he

should seek [outside] advice from an immigration specialist." 16 As a
result, the defendant, having limited financial resources, "paid an
immigration paralegal to assess his situation and was erroneously informed that a single misdemeanor conviction would have no adverse
immigration consequences."' 7 Thus, the defendant argued that Mr.
Stoll's ineffective of assistance of counsel forced him to rely upon
incorrect advice of a non-professional.'"
At the time, the defendant was a lawful resident of the United
Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 404-05, 407 (reasoning that because the defendant was prejudiced as a result of his attorney failing to inform him of the possible immigration consequences of his plea agreement, and telling him to seek outside immigration advice, he satisfied both prongs of the Strickland test).
9 Id. at 399.
10 Id. (violating N.Y PENAL LAW § 220.39(1) (McKinney 2010)).
1 Id. (violating N.Y PENAL LAW § 220.31 (McKinney 2010)).
12 Id. (violating N.Y PENAL LAW § 220.03 (McKinney 2010)).
'3 Garcia,907 N.Y.S.2d at 399-400.
14 Id. at 400.

1s Id. Mr. Stoll also admitted to the court that his client had retained independent immigration advice. Id.
16 Id.

17 Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
18 Id
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States dating back to 2005, but was still "a native citizen of the Dominican Republic."l 9 Following his plea and sentencing in this case,
the defendant traveled outside the United States, believing his conviction in 2008 "would not cause any immigration issues." 20 However,
on April 14, 2010, only one day following his re-entry into the United
States at JFK International Airport, he was arrested by Immigration
and Customs Enforcement officials. 21 The defendant was charged
with violating sections 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 22 and 212 (a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 23
of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"). 24
Subsequently, on June 30, 2010 the defendant filed a CPL
440.10 motion seeking to vacate his judgment of conviction, alleging
that as a result of the recent Supreme Court decision in Padilla v.
Kentucky, 25 which held that defense counsel must inform their clients
of immigration consequences as a result of accepting a guilty plea, he
received ineffective assistance of counsel as his defense counsel
failed to inform him of the immigration consequences of his 2008
guilty plea to a controlled substance offense.26
The issue before the court in Garcia was whether the recent
United States Supreme Court decision in Padillav. Kentucky27 was to
be applied retroactively, and if so, whether Garcia established a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim under both the two
prong test of Strickland v. Washington,28 and New York's "meaning-

19 Id.
20

id.
Id. at 400-01.
22 Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 401. Commission of a crime of moral turpitude. Id. This
was
later dismissed by the immigration court as it was a result of the defendant's 1996 New York
attempted assault conviction, which was "improperly brought because he had previously obtained a waiver of that conviction when he obtained a green card in 2005." Id.
23 Id. Commission of a crime relating to a controlled substance.
Id.
24 Garcia,907 N.Y.S.2d
at 401.
25 130 S. Ct. 1473 (U.S.
2010).
26 Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 399. The defendant also insisted that had he been
correctly
informed about the immigration consequences of his plea by Mr. Stoll, he would have never
taken the plea. Id at 401.
27 See 130 S. Ct. at 1486 (establishing that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim can
be brought under Strickland if a criminal defendant is not informed by his or her counsel
about the possible immigration consequences of the plea agreements).
28 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The first prong requires the defendant to show that counsel's representation was deficient and that it "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness."
The second prong requires the defendant show that he was prejudiced. Id at 687-88.
21
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ful representation" standard. 29 The court went on to conclude that
Padillawas to be applied retroactively, and that Garcia established a
successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim under both the
Strickland and New York standards.3 0
Before Padillawas decided, the rule in New York and several
other states was that deportation constituted a collateral consequence,
and "failure by a defendant's attorney to warn the defendant of the
possibility of deportation was not grounds to claim ineffective assistance of counsel." 31 However, this changed when the United States
Supreme Court decided Padilla.32 In Padilla,the petitioner, Jose Padilla, pled guilty to the "transportation of a large [quantity] of marijuana in his tractor-trailer . . . in Kentucky."33 The petitioner was a
"native of Honduras, [but had] been a lawful permanent resident of
the United States for more than 40 years." 34 During his postconviction proceeding, the petitioner claimed that his counsel failed
to advise him of the immigration consequences resulting from the
plea agreement.35 Had he not received erroneous advice from his attorney, the petitioner insisted that he would have gone to trial.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky denied post-conviction relief
to Padilla, holding that "the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel does not protect a criminal defendant from
erroneous advice about deportation because it is merely a 'collateral'
consequence of his conviction.",3 The United States Supreme Court
29 Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 403 (quoting People v. Baldi, 429 N.E.2d 400, 405 (N.Y.
1981)) ("So long as the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed
in totality and as of the time of the representation, reveal that the attorney provided meaningful representation, the constitutional requirement will have been met.").
3o Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 404-05, 407.
31 Id. at 401. See People v. Ford, 657 N.E.2d 265 (N.Y 1995);
see also People v. Gravino,
928 N.E.2d 1048 (N.Y 2010); Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel And The Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697 (2002)
(showing that the rule stating that attorneys have no responsibility to inform their clients of
collateral consequences was not just the rule in New York, as "eleven federal circuits, more
than thirty states, and the District of Columbia have held that lawyers need not explain collateral consequences").
32 Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
" Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477.
34 id
3 Id. at 1477-78. The petitioner stated that his counsel told him that because he had been
in the country for more than forty years, he did not have to worry about his immigration status. Id.

31 Id. at 1478.

3 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 ("In its view, neither counsel's failure to advise petitioner
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then granted certiorari to decide the issue of whether Padilla's counsel was obligated to advise him "that the offense to which he was
pleading guilty would result in his removal from this country."3 The
Court ultimately held that the petitioner's counsel was obligated to
advise him that he may be deported if he accepts the guilty plea.39
The Padilla Court began its analysis by explaining that the
state of federal immigration law has changed dramatically over the
last ninety years, and as a result, "[t]he 'drastic measure' of deportation or removal, is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes."4 0 Moreover, the Court held that because deportation is a consequence of a criminal conviction, it makes
"it difficult to classify it as either a direct or a collateral consequence."4 1 Thus, when evaluating a Strickland claim, it would be
"ill-suited" to determine whether the consequence of deportation is
direct or collateral. 42 Therefore, the Court concluded that accepting
the petitioner's claims as true, he satisfied the first prong of the
Strickland test, but stated that they would not decide whether he was
prejudiced as a result of taking the plea.43
In addition, the Court reasoned that a holding limited to afabout the possibility of removal, nor counsel's incorrect advice, could provide a basis for relief.").
3 Id. ("We agree with Padilla that constitutionally competent counsel would have advised
him that his conviction for drug distribution made him subject to automatic deportation.").
3
Id. at 1486.
40 Id. at 1478. See, e.g., Natsu Taylor Saito, Judgments Judged And Wrongs Remembered: Examining The Japanese American Civil Liberties Cases on Their Sixtieth Anniversary: Interning the "Non-Alien" Other: The Illusory Protections of Citizenship, 68 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 173, 201 (2005). The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) made it "easier to deport immigrants not only for their political
associations, but also for minor criminal convictions." Id. The IIRIRA allowed for retroactive deportation of "for a wide range of minor crimes that have been redefined as 'aggravated felonies.' " Id. Because of this, "numerous long-time permanent residents have been
deported for misdemeanor pleas or convictions several decades old." Id.
41 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.
42 Id. This is significant because prior to Padilla,the general rule was that "counsel's failure to inform a defendant of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea is never deficient
performance under Strickland." Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327, 334 (5th
Cir. 2008).
43 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483-84. In order to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test,
"the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. In order to satisfy the second prong of the
Strickland test, "the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id.
at 694.
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firmative misadvice," which is what the Solicitor General has urged
it to conclude, would invite "two absurd results."4 5 First, the Court
believed that "it would give [attorneys] an incentive to remain silent"
on important matters, "even [if] the answers are readily available." 4 6
Second, the Court stated "it would deny a class of clients least able to
represent themselves the most rudimentary advice on deportation
even when it is readily available."4 7
The PadillaCourt also addressed the concern of the possible
increase in litigation as a result of its decision.4 8 The Court explained
that for at least the past fifteen years, it has been a professional norm
for counsel to provide advice on deportation consequences of their
client's plea, and therefore, it is "unlikely that [its] decision [would]
have a significant [impact] on those convictions already obtained as
the result of plea bargains." 49
Moreover, the Court stated that requiring counsel to inform
clients about the possibility of deportation benefits both the State and
noncitizen defendants.5 The Court reasoned that attorneys who are
aware of the consequence of possible deportation can now "creatively" plea bargain with the prosecution "in order to craft a conviction
and sentence that reduce the likelihood of deportation, as by avoiding
a conviction for an offense that automatically triggers the removal
consequence." 5 ' Furthermore, the Court explained that a defendant
who is aware of the threat of deportation, may be more inclined to
plead guilty to an offense that will not impose the penalty of deportation on them, in exchange for dismissing a charge that would.5 2
Thus, for the reasons stated above, the Court concluded that an inef4 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484 ("In the United States' view, 'counsel is not constitutionally
required to provide advice on matters that will not be decided in the criminal case . . . '
though counsel is required to provide accurate advice if she chooses to discusses these matters.").
45

id

4 Id. (explaining that attorneys should not be encouraged to say nothing when they know
that their clients face possible deportation from the country).
47 id
48

id
49 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 ("We should therefore presume that counsel satisfied their

obligation to render competent advice at the time their clients considered pleading guilty.").
5o Id at 1486 ("By bringing deportation consequences into this process, the defense and
prosecution may well be able to reach agreements that better satisfy the interests of both parties.").
s' Id
52 id
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fective assistance of counsel claim can be brought under Strickland
for counsel's failure to inform his or her clients about possible immigration consequences of their plea.53
Following the Court's holding in Padilla, the lower courts
were charged with deciding whether Padillais to be applied retroactively, and therefore should be applied to those convictions which occurred prior to Padilla. In order to determine whether Padillashould
be applied retroactively, the Garciacourt discussed Teague v. Lane,54
which set forth the standard in determining when to apply decisions
retroactively.5 ' The Teague Court adopted Justice Harlan's view of
retroactivity stemming from his opinion in Mackey v. United States,56
and explained that new rules should never be applied retroactively to
cases on collateral review." However, Justice Harlan identified two
exceptions to that rule.58 The first exception indicates that "a new
rule should be applied retroactively if it places 'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal
law-making authority to proscribe.' "59 The second exception suggests that "a new rule should be applied retroactively if it requires the
observance of 'those procedures that .. . are 'implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty.' "60
The Teague Court, however, modified the second exception,
stating that it is to be "reserved for watershed rules of criminal procedure." 6 1 Moreover, the Court limited the scope of the second exception to those new procedures, without which the likelihood of an acs3 id.
54

489 U.S. 288 (1989).

Id. at 310 (explaining that a new rule will not be applied retroactively unless it falls
within one of the exceptions).
56 401 U.S. 667 (1971).
5 Teague, 489 U.S. at 305, 310. Meaning also that if a rule is not considered "new" it
could be applied retroactively. Id The Court also explained that "a case announces a new
rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal
Government." Id. at 301.
5s

5

Id. at 307.

Id (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692).
Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693).
61 Id. at 311. The Court reasoned that Justice Harlan's opinion in Mackey implied
that the
new rule must be a "bedrock procedural element" for it to be applied retroactively. Id
Moreover, the court explained that a "watershed" rule is one that "will properly alter our understanding of the bedrock proceduralelements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a
particular conviction. For example, such . .. is the case with the right to counsel at trial now
held a necessary condition precedent to any conviction." Id. (emphasis in original).
5
60
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curate conviction would be greatly diminished.6 2 Essentially, the
Court explained that new constitutional rules of criminal procedure
would not be applied retroactively unless they fall within one of these
exceptions.63
With regards to the Padilla decision specifically, the courts
are split on whether or not it announced a new rule, and if so, whether
or not to adopt it retroactively when applying the Teague exceptions." In United States v. Hubenig,65 the petitioner, Adam Hubenig,
a Canadian citizen, was arrested while visiting Yosemite National
Park.66 Mark Fahrety, a National Park Service Ranger, stopped the
petitioner's car and subsequently arrested him for a traffic control violation, excessive speed, and possession of a controlled substance.6 7
John Frankel, the attorney representing the petitioner, advised him to
plead guilty to all three offenses even though Frankel was aware that
the petitioner was a citizen of Canada, and that he had been convicted
of possession of a controlled substance a few months prior.6 8 Taking
his attorney's advice, the petitioner pled guilty to all three charges.69
However, in the fall of 2008, the petitioner was subjected to deportation proceedings as a result of his two prior convictions for drug possession.70 Subsequently, the petitioner filed a writ of coram nobis,7

6
63

Id. at 313.

6

Id. at *4.

Teague, 489 U.S. at 310. See also People v. Eastman, 648 N.E.2d 459, 465 (N.Y 1995)
(observing that New York has also adopted the Teague exceptions for retroactivity).
( See United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80179 (E.D.
Cal. July 1, 2010); United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
81860 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2010); People v. Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y City Crim. Ct.
2010); United States v. Obonaga, No. 07-CR-402 (JS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63872
(E.D.N.Y June 24, 2010) (holding that Padilla should be applied retroactively); but see
Gacko v. United States, No. 09-CV-4938 (ARR), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50617 (E.D.N.Y
May 20, 2010); People v. Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d 887 (N.Y City Crim. Ct. 2010) (holding that
Padillashould not be applied retroactively).
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80179.
67 Id.
68 Id. at

*4-5.

69 Id. at *5. As a result, the petitioner "was fined $350.00, sentenced to twelve months of

unsupervised probation, and ordered to stay away from Yosemite National Park for the full
term of his probation." Hubenig, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80179, at *5.
70 Id.

71 Id. at *1. "The writ of coram nobis is an extraordinary remedy that allows a petitioner

to attack an unconstitutional or unlawful conviction after the petitioner has served his sentence and is no longer in custody." Id. at *3. (emphasis in original). A petitioner must establish the following to qualify for coram nobis relief: "(1) a more usual remedy is not availa-
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and the primary issue presented before the court in addressing possible coram nobis relief was whether Padilla applied retroactively to
the petitioner's case.7 2
The court, looking at the Teague analysis, first tackled the issue of whether or not Padillaannounced a "new" rule. Its analysis
began by stating that even when the "Supreme Court applies a wellestablished rule of law in a new way based on the specific facts of a
particular case, it does not generally establish a new rule."74 Additionally, the Teague court stated that Strickland is to be applied on a
case by case basis.7 5 As such, it concluded that because the issue in
Padillawas whether or not the defendant had a valid claim for ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, the Padilla Court
simply applied Strickland to the specific facts of the case, and thus,
did not create a new rule.7 6
The court also noted that in a number of somewhat recent Supreme Court opinions applying Strickland to different examples of
counsels' behavior, the Supreme Court has yet to apply a "new rule
status" to any of the cases.7 The Hubenig court analogized those
cases to Padilla,where the Supreme Court also applied Strickland to
"defense counsel's failure to advise her client regarding the possible

ble; (2) valid reasons exist for not attacking the conviction earlier; (3) adverse consequences
exist from the conviction to satisfy the case and controversy requirement of Article III; and
(4) the error suffered is of the most fundamental character." Id at *5-6.
The court first concluded that the first
72 Hubenig, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80179, at *12.
three elements to qualify for coram nobis relief were satisfied, leaving only the question of
whether petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel, which can satisfy the fourth
element. Id. at *6, 9-12. Thus, the court had to address whether or not Padilla applied retroactively. Id. at 12.
7 Id. at *12-13. The court stated that Teague's general principle is that " 'new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become
final before the new rules are announced.' " Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 310).
74 Hubenig, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80179, at *13.
7 Id at *14.
71 Id. at * 14-16, 21. The Hubenig court stated that" '[i]f the rule in question is one which
of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence, then we can tolerate a
number of specific applications without saying that those applications themselves create a
new rule.' " Id. at *14-15 (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308 (1992)).
n7 Id. at *15. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005) (failing to investigate
a file that contained evidence that the state intended to use in aggravation); Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524-25 (2003) (failing to investigate Wiggins's background, regardless
of the fact that there was evidence of his abusive upbringing); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 395 (2000) (failing to look up available state records indicating Williams' "nightmarish
childhood").
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immigration consequences of his guilty plea." 78 Moreover, the court
determined that Padilla was not to be considered a "new rule" because the rule is not a "novel concept." 79 As one example, the court
pointed out that in another Ninth Circuit decision, United States v.
Kwan,80 decided five years before Padilla,the court ruled that counsel had a responsibility not to mislead his client when advising
whether a guilty plea would create any deportation consequences.
Furthermore, the Hubenig court reasoned that because the
PadillaCourt gave serious consideration to the possibility that its ruling would open the "floodgates" to new litigation, it intended the rule
to be applied retroactively. 82 Thus, for all the reasons stated above,
the Hubenig court concluded that Padillashould be applied retroactively as it did not establish a "new rule."8 Therefore, the petitioner's claims were found to have satisfied both prongs of the Strickland
test, his writ of coram nobis was granted, and his guilty pleas were
vacated.84
New York courts have also addressed the issue of whether to
apply Padilla retroactively. In People v. Bennett,85 a New York
criminal court case, the court held that the Padilladecision should be
applied retroactively to the defendant's case, as it did not announce a
new rule, but merely applied the rule in Strickland to a new set of
facts.86 In Bennett, the defendant was arrested in June of 2005 for

78 Id. at *16. See also Chaidez, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81860, at *11-12,
20 (holding
also that Padillawas an extension of the rule in Strickland, and that it did not overturn any
prior decision of the Supreme Court, and thus could be applied retroactively).
7
Hubening, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80179, at *16.
8o 407 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. Cal. 2005).
' Hubenig, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80179, at *17. See Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1017; see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322, 323 n.50 (2001) (stating that "competent defense counsel, following the advice of numerous practice guides" would have advised their clients regarding whether or not their conviction could possibly make them deportable," and that
"preserving the client's right to remain in the United States may be more important to the
client than any potential jail sentence").
82 Hubenig, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80179, at *20. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 (stating
that "we must be especially careful about recognizing new grounds for attacking the validity
of guilty plea," and that "[i]t seems unlikely that our decision today will have a significant
effect on those convictions already obtained as the result of plea bargains").
83 Id. at *21.
'
8

86

Id. at *26-27.
903 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y City Crim. Ct. 2010).
Id. at 699-700.
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possession of marijuana." Subsequently, in December of 2005, the
defendant pled guilty to "criminal possession of marijuana in the fifth
degree."
Bennett's affidavit alleged that he only entered into the plea
agreement because his attorney failed to inform him of immigration
consequences he may suffer as a result of his plea. 89 The defendant
alleged that before he agreed to the plea, he told his attorney, Jeffrey
Pogrow, that he had a previous violation for possessing marijuana
and that his mother filed a petition on his behalf to make him a permanent resident of the United States. 90 Bennett claimed he asked his
attorney, Mr. Pogrow, if his plea would have any immigration consequences, to which Mr. Pogrow said " 'no,' " and that he " 'did not

think it would.' "9'
However, on December 14, 2005, Mr. Pogrow had indicated
to the court on the record that he did indeed inform the defendant of
possible immigration consequences.9 2 However, the defendant took
that to mean that they had simply discussed the consequences and
that there were none. 93 The defendant argued that since he agreed to
the plea deal, his life was "turned upside down" because his adjustment of status was denied, and as a result, he was deemed "deportable from the United States based upon the subject conviction. "94 The
defendant insisted that, had he known of these consequences resulting
from a guilty plea, he would have gone to trial instead. 95 Mr. Pogrow's affidavit on the other hand stated that he did indeed inform
the defendant that it was possible he could have immigration consequences that could affect his immigration status.9 6 Moreover, Mr.
Pogrow stated that despite his advice, the defendant chose not to go
to trial and instead accepted the plea deal. 97
The Bennett court concluded that Padilla"did not announce a
Id. at 697.
88
89

Id. The defendant did not file a direct appeal of his conviction. Id.
Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d at 697.

90 Id.
91 Id
92 id.

SId
Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d at 697-98.
9 Id at 698.
96 id
97 id
94
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new constitutional rule, but merely applied the well-settled rule in
Strickland to a particular set of facts." 98 The court reasoned that because Padillasimply held that Strickland "applies to advice concerning deportation, whether mis-advice or no advice at all," it did not
overrule a clear past precedent. 99 Thus, the Bennett court ruled that,
rather than creating a new rule, Padilla merely extended an existing
one.' 00 Additionally, the court believed "if the Supreme Court did
not intend for Padilla to be retroactively applied, that would render
meaningless the majority's lengthy discussion about concerns that
Padillawould open the 'floodgates' of challenges to guilty pleas."' 0
Furthermore, the Bennett court reasoned that in both, People
0 3 two New York cases decided
v. Ford,102 and People v. McDonald,'
before Padilla,the courts found it possible that misinformation given
by an attorney concerning immigration consequences may constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland.10 4 As such, the
Bennett court concluded that the holding in Padilla,did not "depart[]
from established precedent," and thus, could be applied retroactively,
as it did not create a new rule.'0o
Unlike Bennett and Hubenig, People v. Kabrel06 held that Pa-

9 Id. at 699.
9 Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d at 699. The Supreme Court has also held in Williams that applying Stricklandto a new set of facts did not establish a new rule under Teague because merely
applying Strickland to a new scenario does not create a new rule, as "it can hardly be said
that recognizing the right to effective counsel breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States." Williams, 529 U.S. at 391.
'" Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
101 Id. (citing Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485) (stating "we must be especially careful about
recognizing new grounds for attacking the validity of guilty pleas," and that "[ijt seems unlikely that our decision today will have a significant effect on those convictions already obtained as the result of plea bargains").
102 657 N.E.2d 265 (N.Y. 1995).
103 802 N.E.2d 131 (N.Y. 2003).
'0 See Ford,657 N.E.2d at 268 ("Although the failure to advise a defendant of the possibility of deportation does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, some Federal
courts have held that affirmative misstatements by defense counsel, may, under certain circumstances."); see also McDonald, 802 N.E.2d at 132 ("[U]nder certain circumstances, a
defense counsel's incorrect advice as to deportation consequences of a plea may constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel.").
105 Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d at 700. In addition, the court found that the defendant satisfied
both prongs of the Stricklandtest, as his attorney's representation fell below reasonable professional norms, and because he was prejudiced as a result of this. Id. at 702.
" 905 N.Y.S.2d 887 (N.Y City Crim. Ct. 2010).
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dilla was not to be applied retroactively.10 7 In Kabre, the petitioner, a
citizen of Burkina Faso, was arrested and subsequently charged with
trademark counterfeiting in the third degree in 2002, 2003, and
2004.108 Each of these cases was resolved subsequent to the petitioner agreeing to a guilty plea.' 0 9 As a result of these three convictions,
the petitioner had a total of nine convictions for trademark counterfeiting.110 When the petitioner discovered he could possibly be deported as a result of these convictions, he sought to vacate the three
judgments, arguing his "prior counsel was ineffective for not giving
[him] any advice at all about the potential immigration consequences
of his convictions.""' The petitioner also claimed had he known
about the possible immigration consequences of a guilty plea, he
would have gone to trial instead of accepting the plea.112
The court, quoting Teague, stated that "a 'new' rule [i]s one
that breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the states or
on the federal government; a rule is also new if the result was not
'dictatedby precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction
became final.' 113 The court rationalized that the petitioner would
be entitled to relief if the New York courts in 2005114 "would have
been required by controlling United States Supreme Court precedent
to rule that failure to discuss the immigration consequences of a
guilty plea was ineffective assistance of counsel.""' After analyzing
both New York and federal law, the court concluded that the law in
2005 did not require attorneys to give any advice about the possible
immigration consequences of a guilty plea. 116 Thus, the court ruled
that Padilla established a new rule, as it was not dictated by
Id. at 891 (concluding that "in Padillathe Supreme Court announced a new rule of
criminal procedure rather than applied settled law to a new set of facts and
that the Padillarule is not a 'watershed' change that must be applied retroactively to cases
on collateral review"). See also Gacko, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50617, at *6 (E.D.N.Y May
20, 2010) (holding also that Padillawas not to be applied retroactively).
10 Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
107

109 Id
110

Id.

"' Id. at 889.
112 Id. at 890.
113

Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 892 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 333) (emphasis in orig-

inal).
114
1"
116

Id. 2005 is "when the last conviction at issue [would become] final." Id
Id. at 892.
Id at 895.
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precedent." 7
Additionally, the court held Padilla to be a new rule even
though it did not overrule any Supreme Court decision because it did
"overrule decisions from ten of the federal circuit courts and twentythree states, and certainly has in this sense established a new rule in
those jurisdictions."" 8 Moreover, the court indicated that it has
"found no decision of the United States Supreme Court holding that
one of its decisions overruling a majority of the lower federal courts
resulted from a mere application of settled law and was not a new
rule"" 9 For these reasons, the court concluded that Padilla estab-

lished a new rule.1 20
The court also disagreed with the reasoning previously applied by the court in Bennett.' 2' The court believed the Bennett court
wrongfully concluded, among other things,122 that Padillawas an old
rule because it merely applied Strickland to a new set of facts, which
is exactly what the Williams Court did.123 In contrast, when analyzing Padilla, the Kabre court reasoned that it "did not simply apply
Strickland or any other Supreme Court precedent to an issue considered before." 2 4 Therefore, the court stated that a ruling requiring
courts to judge an attorney's performance in an area that was consi117 Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 895-96 (concluding that no New York court in 2005 would
have found a Supreme Court case holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim can
be brought against an attorney for failing to inform their clients about possible immigration
consequence of a plea, and that it was irrelevant whether or not the consequences were direct
or collateral when "analyzing the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel").
118

Id. at 896.

119 Id. (emphasis added).
120 Id at 897.
121 Id. at 896.
122 Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 897-98. The court disagreed with the fact that the Bennett
court took Padilla'sdiscussion regarding a potential increase of litigation to mean that it anticipated being applied retroactively, and it also disagreed with the fact that Bennett believed
McDonald showed Padilla was not a break from precedent, as other New York courts had
not followed that rule even after it was decided. Id.
123 Id. at 896-97. The Supreme Court in Williams concluded that the failure to look up
available state records amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel by applying those facts
to Strickland. Williams, 529 U.S. at 391, 395.
124 Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 897 (stating that "[tihe issue was not whether an alien defendant has the same right to a competent lawyer as has a citizen defendant, but whether the
scope of that representation extends to giving advice about the consequences of a conviction
in addition to the sentencing," which was never previously required by any federal appellate
court).
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dered collateral prior to Padilla breaks new ground and is thus
"4'new.' "9125

While the court concluded that Padillawas a new rule, in order to fully analyze whether Padillashould be applied retroactively,
the Kabre court examined the Teague exceptions. 126 The court noted
that "a new rule will be applied retroactively only if it fits within the
exception created for 'watershed' rules which alter a 'bedrock procedural element of criminal procedure which implicates the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the trial.' ,127 Thus, the court, quoting
Whorton v. Bockting,128 acknowledged that a "watershed rule must,
therefore, be necessary to prevent an 'impermissibly large risk of an
inaccurate conviction' and one which alters our understanding of the
'bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.' "129
The court concluded that the "Padilla[rule] is not necessary
to prevent any risk of an inaccurate conviction," and that it does not
"alter the understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential
to the fairness of the proceeding, even though it [discusses] the right
to counsel." 30 The court suggested that only Gideon v. Wainwright,'3 ' which established the right to counsel, qualifies as a "watershed" ruling, and that the "Padilla[rule] is not as sweeping and
fundamental as that of Gideon, and it does not, therefore, rise to the
status of a watershed rule that must be applied retroactively." 32
Therefore, the Kabre court stated that the new rule, which does not
fall within the Teague exceptions, is not to be applied retroactively,
and the petitioner is not entitled to relief.'3 3
The court in Garcia explained that Padillaapplied Strickland
125

id.
Id. at 898.
127 Id. (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 311). Noting that the Supreme Court
has stressed that
the exception is exceedingly narrow. Id
128 549 U.S. 406 (2007).
129 Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 899 (quoting Whorton, 549
U.S. at 418).
130 Id. at 899.
13' 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
132 Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 899 (reasoning that "[it is unconscionable
to convict and incarcerate a defendant who had no lawyer to give advice about the legal process, present a
defense, or argue for leniency," however, "it does not shock the conscience to deny a hearing
about what immigration advice was given six years ago or more to a defendant who already
had a substantial criminal record and avoided incarceration by taking a plea").
126

133

Id. at 899-900.
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to a new set of facts, and as a result, "Padilladid not create a new
rule."l 3 4 The Garcia court also agreed with the reasoning of the Padilla Court, which explained that it "was ill-suited [in] the immigration context" to distinguish between collateral and direct consequences of a criminal conviction, "and that the distinction between no
advice and misadvice leads to absurd results."13 1 Consequently, the
court concluded that Padillashould be applied retroactively to the defendant's case."'
The Garciacourt was correct in deciding that Padillawas not
a new rule, and therefore, should be applied retroactively to the defendant's case.137 It is unequivocal that, like the Bennett and Hubenig courts, Padilla was not a break from precedent."' The Kabre
court was incorrect when ruling that Padilladid break from precedent
and was therefore a new rule, but should not be applied retroactively
as it did not fit into one of the two Teague exceptions.1 39 Even
though the Kabre court does bring up interesting points about the fact
that Padillaoverruled the majority of the lower federal courts,140 this
is unpersuasive. Padillasimply applied Strickland to a different set
of facts, just as several other courts did.141
Furthermore, even though the Garcia court properly ruled that
the Padillarule was not new, and therefore should be applied retroactively, it did not analyze, nor did it have to, the possibility of it being
134 Garcia,907 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
136 Id. In addition, the Garcia court also stated that it interpreted Padilla as holding that
"since the severe changes affecting immigration law in recent years, the Stricklandstandards
have not been met where defense attorneys failed to give correct advice to clients in criminal
cases facing deportation, when the immigration consequences were readily ascertainable, as
they were in Padillaand in Garcia."Id. Furthermore, the court ruled that because the defendant's attorney did not inform him of possible immigration consequences and told him to
seek outside immigration advice, and because the defendant was prejudiced by this, the defendant satisfied both prongs of the Strickland test, as well as the New York "meaningful
representation" test, and therefore, was successful in establishing ineffective assistance of
counsel. Id. at 407. The court then granted the defendants CPL 440.10 motion, and as a result, the defendant's plea and sentence were vacated. Garcia,907 N.Y.S.2d at 407.
'1 Id. at 404.
' See Hubenig, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80179, at *16-17; see also Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d
at 699.
" Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
140 id
141 See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510
(2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (applying Strickland to a different set of
facts).
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a new rule. Following the three prong test in People v. Mitchell, 42 a
New York Court of Appeals case, even if the Garcia court decided
that Padilla was a new rule, it still would have most likely been applied retroactively to the defendant's case. According to Mitchell, in
determining the retroactive effect of a new rule, three factors must be
evaluated: "(1) the purpose to be served by the new rule, (2) the extent of reliance on the old rule, and (3) the effect on the administration ofjustice of retroactive application."1 43
When analyzing the first prong, it is clear that there is a very
specific purpose to be served by the new Padillarule. As a result of
several changes in immigration law, "[t]he 'drastic measure' of deportation or removal, is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of
noncitizens convicted of crimes."'" Therefore, the purpose of the
Padillarule is to ensure that criminal defendants understand the risk
of possible immigration consequences resulting from their guilty
pleas. Requiring attorneys to inform their clients about these possible
consequences will best serve this purpose.
With regard to the second prong of the Mitchell test, even
45
even Ford
though attorneys in New York have relied on Ford,1
stated that "[a]lthough the failure to advise a defendant of the possibility of deportation does not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel, some federal courts have held that affirmative misstatements
by defense counsel, may, under certain circumstances." 4 6 Thus, it is
evident that the rule was not set in stone, and could be up for interpretation depending on the circumstances, which is precisely what the

court stated in McDonald.147 Moreover, as stated in INS v. St. Cyr,14 8
606 N.E.2d 1381 (N.Y. 1992). This test is to be used "when the [c]ourt is confronted
with the question of whether to grant retroactive effect to a new rule or to apply the rule." Id.
at 1385.
143 Id. at 1384.
'4 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. "While once there was only a narrow class of deportable
offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to prevent deportation, immigration reforms over time have expanded the class of deportable offenses and limited the authority ofjudges to alleviate the harsh consequences of deportation." Id.
145 Ford, 657 N.E.2d at 268 (explaining that because deportation is a collateral consequence, "our Appellate Division and the Federal courts have consistently held that the trial
court need not, before accepting a plea of guilty, advise a defendant of the possibility of deportation").
146 Id. at 268-69.
147 McDonald, 802 N.E.2d at 132 (stating that "under certain circumstances, a defense
counsel's incorrect advice as to deportation consequences of a plea may constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel").
142
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"competent defense counsel, following the advice of numerous practice guides" would have advised their clients regarding whether or
not their conviction could possibly make them deportable.149 Therefore, it is unequivocal that the reliance on the old rule was not mandatory, as the cases left open other possibilities.
As for the third prong of the Mitchell test, as stated previously, applying Padillaretroactively would not substantially increase the
amount of litigation.15 0 The Padilla Court addressed this issue and
clearly explained that it has been a custom for counsel to provide advice on deportation consequences of their client's plea over the last
fifteen years, and therefore, it is unlikely that its "decision . . .
[would] have a significant effect on those convictions already obtained as the result of plea bargains. "'5' Moreover, Padillastressed
that not everyone who has ever faced immigration consequences after
a guilty plea would now "storm" the courts.152 The Court explained
that "[t]hose who collaterally attack their guilty pleas lose the benefit
of the bargain obtained as a result of the plea."l 53 Thus, the risk of
the challenge resulting in a less favorable outcome for the defendant
will provide a compelling reason not to go through with it, and is
another reason why there will not be a substantial increase in litigation.154 In addition, because Strickland is so difficult to overcome,
prior convictions are not likely to be disturbed,'5 5 and an "opening of
the floodgates" is not expected. Therefore, after analyzing all three
prongs of the Mitchell test with respect to the new Padilla rule, it is
clear that it should be applied retroactively to the defendant's case,
even if it was announced as a new rule.
Moreover, the recent trend in New York regarding this issue
is that Padilla should be applied retroactively.156 Five months after
148

533 U.S. 289.

Id. at 323 n.50 (2001).
Iso Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485.
'15Id. at 1485 (explaining that it should "presume that counsel satisfied their obligation to
render competent advice at the time their clients considered pleading guilty").
152 id
153 Id
154 Id. at 1485-86.
.. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485. See also Strickland,466 U.S. at 693 ("Attorney errors
come in an infinite variety and are as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they
are to be prejudicial.").
156 See, e.g., People v. Nunez, No. 2009-1833 S CR., 2010 N.Y Misc. LEXIS 6163 (N.Y.
2d Dept. App. Term Dec. 15, 2010).
149
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the trial court's decision in Garcia, the New York Second Department Appellate Term decided People v. Nunez.157 The court, using
the same reasoning evident in Garcia,Bennett, and Hubenig, ruled
that Padillawas to be applied retroactively because it was not a "new
rule," as it "merely applied the well-established Strickland standard
to the facts therein."15 8
Failure to apply Padillaretroactively would constitute a grave
injustice to people who were provided with incorrect information
about possible immigration consequences of a plea agreement or who
were not provided with information at all. As the Padilla Court
pointed out, there is no reason that, in times like this, where immigration law is undergoing dramatic changes,' 5 9 counsel should not have
to inform his or her clients about possible deportation as a result of
them accepting certain plea agreements.i1o This severely prejudices
the criminal defendants because, in some cases, they would not accept a deal knowing these possible deportation consequences, and
could take their chances at trial.
Additionally, positive effects on the legal profession are certain to come following the decision of Padilla. Requiring defense attorneys to notify their clients of possible deportation consequences
will only make their job easier. The PadillaCourt stated that "[b]y
bringing deportation consequences into this process, the defense and
prosecution may well be able to reach agreements that better satisfy
the interests of both parties."l61 This is evidenced by certain statutes
that allow for the deportable criminal defendant to "waive the right to
notice and a hearing . . . and stipulate to the entry of a judicial order
of removal from the United States as a condition of the plea agreement." 162
The Padilladecision will also likely "encourage closer working relationships between the criminal defense and immigration bars,
157 id.

15 Id. at *6 (stating also that Padilla"is the application of a well-established old rule").
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
1'
160 Id. at 1483-84.
161 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486. See also Margaret Love & Gabriel J. Chin, The "Major
Upheaval" ofPadilla v. Kentucky: Extending the Right to Counsel to the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, 25 CRIM. JUST. 36, 40 (2010) (stating that "[t]here is also evidence
that prosecutors take the possibility of deportation and other collateral consequences into
account in plea negotiations").
162 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.A. § 1228(c)(5) (West 2010).
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and a better understanding by defense lawyers of what is concededly
a complex and uncertain area of the law." 63 Furthermore, prosecutors will benefit from the Padilla decision. Prosecutors can recommend deportation instead of a jail sentence in guilty pleas, which is a
strategy that has been used before,1 " but by now requiring defense
attorneys to inform their clients of the possible deportation consequences, criminal defendants may now be more inclined to accept
these guilty pleas. The Court in Padilla,like Hubenig, cited St. Cyr,
and concluded that in most cases, these defendants are more concerned with staying in the United States and avoiding jail time.' 6 5
Prior to Padilla,the fact that attorneys were not held accountable for
failing to disclose possible deportation consequences to their clients,
when this is what their clients cared about most, was nonsensical.
If the United States Supreme Court, or the New York Court of
Appeals eventually ruled that Padilla could not be applied retroactively, and that it only affects future cases, how could one justify this
to the criminal defendants, who, prior to Padillawere not advised of
the possible deportation consequences of their plea? It seems like the
only logical and reasonable thing to do is to apply Padillaretroactively, just like the Nunez, Bennett, Hubenig, and Garcia courts
rightfully did.
Adam Hyman

Love & Chin, supra note 161, at 40.
1 See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, 45 P.3d 541, 547 (Wash. 2002) (explaining that the witness accepted a plea of guilty because the prosecutor suggested deportation as opposed to a
jail sentence).
161 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483; St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323 ("[P]reserving the possibility of
such relief would have been one of the principal benefits sought by defendants deciding
whether to accept a plea offer or instead to proceed to trial.").
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